The importance of representativeness has long been recognized as a key principle for conservation planning [4]. Incorporating this principle into international treaties, such as the CBD, also establishes its importance for global policy. Despite this, the metrics most frequently used to report on protected area networks ignore a key aspect of representativeness and, in some instances, overestimate progress towards it. This failure to align the objectives of conservation with appropriate reporting measures can mislead decision makers and the public alike, and eventually undermine further expansion of protected areas. If countries are to evaluate real progress towards achieving a representative network of protected areas, then reporting metrics that more accurately align with conservation principles, such as protection equality, are urgently needed.
Could faithful application of basic principles of ecology stem this loss? Or are the principles failing because they cannot be applied competently? An easy but insufficient answer is that the principles may be adequate, but their application to conservation is flawed because of unintentional social or political interference at times hampering resource exploitation on sustainable basis. While it is hard to dispute that the best ecological model in the world may not halt giant international factory ship fleets from destroying fisheries, it may be that social control reaches a deeper level in the structure of science itself. Ecological paradigms tend to evolve themselves and are applied in ways that perhaps limit their utility. If this is true, what should resource managers expect of ecology as a science? How can academics change ecology as a science to make it more operational as a guide to management of nature? We examine how some central ecological ideas elude resource managers or succeed in conservation and explore ways in which the social component of ecological paradigm evolution can do a better job.
Principles Of Conservation Biology 3rd Edition Groom Et Al
Scientific fields change over time and conservation biology is no different. As discussed above, the primary goal of conservation biology has been to maintain and restore natural ecosystems and the species they hold. Many in conservation biology adhere to this goal and have been reluctant to include extrinsically defined (i.e., human-facing) goals. Rather than include humans and their actions as a part of nature, those pursuing the goal of historical fidelity in natural ecosystems exclude humans from the equation. In the United States, the National Park system is a good example of this approach: humans are allowed to visit but the lands remain undeveloped. On top of this, conservation and restoration efforts consciously attempt to maintain these complex systems in the same state they have existed historically. Recognizing that this will not always be possible and, because they believe people should be factored into the plan, others have started working towards a more expansive set of goals.
Still, not all of the more expansive set of goals include human interests. For example, in place of maintaining the exact same ecosystem, efforts instead can be spent towards maximizing the biodiversity in an ecosystem or on mimicking the structure and/or function of the historical ecosystem. These two goals, in particular, reflect the normative postulates presented by Soulé. Maximizing biodiversity matches well with the postulates stating that diversity of organisms is good and biotic diversity has intrinsic value. Mimicking structure and/or function is in acknowledgment of the statement that ecological complexity is good. From a normative perspective, the expanded set of goals in conservation biology is not necessarily any different from the traditional goal.
Conservation paleobiology can help to diversify the approaches to conservation by offering more data, longer timescales, and different perspectives. Whether applied to the traditional or expanded set of goals, geohistorical records provide invaluable context for the world around us today.
Barnosky, A. D., E. A. Hadly, P. Gonzalez, J. Head, P. D. Polly, A. M. Lawing, et al. 2017. Merging paleobiology with conservation biology to guide the future of terrestrial ecosystems. Science, 355: eaah4787.
Conservation biology clearly concerns conserving something biologicalor ecological, but what is or should be conserved? Work has focused ona variety of units. As examples, some have focused on species such asthe spotted owl Strix occidentalis (Yaffee 1994) andloggerhead turtle Caretta caretta (Bolten & Witherington2003); some have focused on populations and sub-species such as wildsalmon Oncorhynchus spp. (Quinn 2005); some have focused onbiomes or eco-regions such as tropical coral in the Great Barrier Reef(Hutchings, Kingsford, & Hoegh-Guldberg 2008); and finally somehave focused on genotypes or genetic features such as heterozygosity(Avise & Hamrick 1996). However, in the 1980s, conservationbiologists united and argued that biodiversity should be thefocus of the discipline (E. O. Wilson 1988; see entry on biodiversity). What then is biodiversity? Here is a standard definition from aninfluential textbook.
Biodiversity is generally the assumed target of conservation biology,but the biological world is composed of a number of distinct types ofdiversity, which only loosely correlate with each other and withbiological value. Since the function of the biodiversity concept inconservation science is to help us preserve or increase biologicalvalue, we should therefore consider eliminating biodiversity from itsprivileged position in conservation theory and practice. (Santana2014: 778)
In the biological sciences especially, one rarely hears talk of laws;rather, it is models that are discussed. We can begin by considering asimple model used in conservation biology, a metapopulation model(Hanski & Gilpin 1997; Levins 1970). A metapopulation is apopulation of populations that are subdivided spatially, but arecausally connected through migration. Let \(P\) be the proportion ofpatches occupied by a species, \(c\) is the rate of patchcolonization, and \(e\) is the rate of patch extinction. Thus, theinstantaneous rate of change in the proportion of occupied patches isthe proportion of patches colonized minus those in which extinctionsoccur. Mathematically, we have,
Though the types of models we have just discussed have an importantplace in the conservation biology and its history, it has become anexplicitly socio-ecological discipline in which sophisticatedcomputational tools are used for the purpose of designing conservationarea networks (see entry on social choice theory). From work involving population genetics and ecology for populationviability analysis and the equilibrium model of MacArthur and Wilson,with the associated SLOSS debate, we see a discipline transformed.Work on the genetics of inbreeding, habitat fragmentation,metapopulation dynamics, and so on continues but in the guise ofsomething more social; namely, systematic conservation planning (SCP)(Margules & Pressey 2000; Margules & Sarkar 2007; Watson etal. 2011). SCP involves a variety of steps including thefollowing:
Thus, in conservation biology, like computer science and unlike mostof ecology, theoretical research consists of devising algorithmsrather than formulating models and theories. In fact, because avariety of algorithms can be used to solve these problems, a lot oftheoretical debate in conservation biology has been about the choiceof algorithms. (Sarkar 2012: 124)
If SCP is science, then neither realism nor empiricism fit the mainaims of science as articulated by prominent philosophers of science.If so much of conservation biology involves developing algorithms andcomputer programs and articulating various conventions, then truth andempirical adequacy are relevant for parts of the discipline butirrelevant for large swaths. Moreover, if theory structure andconfirmation are irrelevant to those swaths because they concern truthor empirical adequacy, then the topic of scientific explanation willbe irrelevant as well. Since there are few theories and models, thenthe questions regarding Bayesian versus frequentist methods ofscientific inference will find less purchase in conservation biologypractice. Additionally, and maybe most important, socioeconomic valuesare inputs into conservation biology and it simply cannot be donewithout them. Or, if it is to be done, it will be the values of asmall set of scientists thus privileging the wrong people (Guha 1998,Martin 2017). If SCP is central to conservation biology, much ofphilosophy of science is irrelevant to conservationbiology. Conservation biology increasingly looks like a pragmatic orinstrumental endeavor. One possible response would be to develop apragmatist or instrumentalist philosophy of science whichde-emphasizes truth and empirical adequacy (Dewey 1938; Laudan1978).
It appears then that there are epistemic and non-epistemic values inthe sciences. Whether the latter should take precedence over theformer is the subject of current philosophicaldiscussions. Conservation biology might very well be such a science wherenon-epistemic values should take precedence over epistemicones. Nevertheless, we are thus left with several questions. First,how do we distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic values inthe sciences? Second, if we can distinguish between them, arenon-epistemic values sometimes more important than epistemic ones?Third, if non-epistemic values are sometimes more important thanepistemic ones, does this occur in conservation biology? Can thesenon-epistemic values include moral and politicalvalues? It is to issues concerning these values that we now turn.
Actively disseminate information to promote understanding of andappreciation for biodiversity and the science of conservation biology.Recognize that uncertainty is inherent in managing ecosystems andspecies and encourage application of the precautionary principle inmanagement and policy decisions affecting biodiversity. 2ff7e9595c